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This paper overlooks the military aspect of the age-long interaction between China and Africa, and 
how it impacts the peace in Africa. Issues that border on China-Africa’s relations have no doubt 
gained currency in academic discourses centering mainly on trade, and economically related factors. 
However, the military dimensions of the relationship, especially China’s military involvement in Africa 
are passing with minimal scholarly attention, yet are in need of examination. Within the general ambit 
of China’s expanding engagement in Africa, this paper discusses the military factor. It historically 
contextualizes China-African military links, and argues that China’s continued arms sales to Africa’s 
problem areas, cynical military relations and support to rogue and blood-thirst regimes, and its 
double-dealing peacekeeping roles in Africa, do not help the peace conditions of Africa’s wobbling 
states.
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Introduction
The Chinese approach to foreign relations 
is officially termed “noninterference in 
domestic affairs”. But Beijing’s recent military 
involvements in Africa and the handling of 
the conflict situation in places like Sudan 
shows that China is learning the limitations 
of noninterference. It is because of strategic 
interests, China is enmeshed in cutting deals 
with bad governments and providing them with 
arms.” Arms sales and military relationships 
help China to gain important African allies 
in the United Nations—including Sudan, 
Zimbabwe, and Nigeria—for its political goals, 
including preventing Taiwanese independence 
and diverting attention from its own human 
rights record. To meet its oil and mineral needs, 
Beijing has consistently delivered arms to pariah 
states in Africa especially the conflict-torn zones 
which have come under western sanctions and 
the United Nations’ embargo, in their attempt to 
address the horrendous massacre and genocidal 
killings that have characterized the politics 
of those areas. Additionally, China has been 
implicated in the proliferation of arms in Africa 
which either provoke conflicts or exacerbates 
the existing ones (Tongkeh, 2009, Alden, 2005, 
Taylor 2005, SAVEDARFUR, 2007). Many 
Chinese firms were accused of smuggling illegal 
arms: Chinese AK-47, machine guns and rocket 
propelled grenade launchers into Liberia, Sierra-
Leone and the Ivory Coast where rebels and 
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mercenaries were involved in civil wars. These 
arms gain faster inroads because of their relatively 
cheap costs. China sold 55million dollars worth of 
arms to Sudan between 2003 and 2006, flouting 
the United Nations arms embargo (Shinn, 2008). 
It was with Chinese assistance that the Sudanese 
government built an arms factory in Khartoum 
during the heat of the war years in Sudan. When 
Zimbabwe came under western sanctions, its 
president Robert Mugabe turned to the east, to 
China, for military assistance. Faced with EU 
and US embargo, Mugabe in 2004 bought fighter 
aircrafts and military vehicles from China. 
The depth of the dubious military transactions 
between China and Mugabe was unveiled in 
the scandal involving a Chinese ship- An Yue 
Jiang, carrying weapons which were destined 
for Zimbabwe, but were stopped in South Africa 
in April 2008 (Brautigam, 2009). As China 
expands its engagement throughout Africa, it 
increasingly finds itself involved in African 
internal affairs militarily. This involvement, 
essentially, takes three forms: Chinese arms 
sales which make their way into conflict zones, 
Chinese participation in UN Peacekeeping 
operations, Chinese responses to the case of 
kidnapping of Chinese nationals or attacks on 
Chinese facilities. On what the Chinese military 
roles in Africa truly portend, and how it impacts 
on the peace of the continent, opinions tend to 
differ. Some argue that through its military deals 
with Africa, China offers security alternative 
to the west for African states, and through its 
deployment of peacekeeping troops to Africa’s 
boiling areas, China’s military presence in Africa 
has impacted positively on the continent (Shinn, 
2009, Kurlantzick, 2009). On the contrary, this 
paper argues that with arms originating from 
China into Africa’s troubled zones, and in 
defiance to the United Nations embargo, Chinese 
determination to militarily protect its economic 
interests in Africa at the expense of millions 
of lives of helpless Africans who either suffer 
death or are internally displaced, conflicts in 
Africa have been exacerbated. Unarguably, this 
has remained a negatively impact on the much 
needed, but lacking peace in Africa.
Historicizing  
china’s military presence in africa  
in pre-indepence period
China’s military relations with Africa go 
back to 1950s when China gave its support to 
revolutionary and independence movements 
in Africa. The Asian-African Conference 
at Bandung, Indonesia was a seminal in the 
Sino-African relationship (Larkin, 1971). The 
conference agenda captured the vexing issues 
of colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic 
position of the Western powers. What the 
participating nations had in common was 
their shared history and perception of white 
dominance by the West (Foster et al, 2009; Looy, 
2006). Thus, the conference was significant 
in spurring the anti-imperialist and the anti-
colonial struggle of the colonially subjugated 
and imperialistically plundered African and 
Asian people. The conference marked the start of 
the definite interest by the Peoples Republic of 
China in the overall African affairs and its anti-
colonial struggle in particular. Beginning from 
this conference, China embarked gradually, its 
military involvement in the continent of Africa. 
From 1957 until the Algerian independence, 
China supplied the Algeria’s National Liberation 
Front, FLN, with military weapons and training 
in Angola’s fight against the French colonial 
power. China offered to send 280,000 volunteers 
to Egypt during the Suez crisis (Taylor, 2006). 
Owing to the deteriorated relationship between 
China and the West (Chiefly USA) on one hand, 
and the Soviet Union on the other hand, China 
saw the disruption and the promotion of unrest in 
Africa as central to China’s policy of frustrating 
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the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. It is on record that the Chinese military 
instructors made Ghana a base for training 
guerrilla fighters in 1964, and that Rhodesian 
freedom fighters received training in China 
(Chuka, 2010). Taylor (2006) contains that from 
Rhodesia, ZANU fighters were taken to China for 
military training. A pocketbook found on the body 
of a guerrilla fighter killed in Sinoia skirmish, 
showed that he had been studying at Nanjing’s 
Military College in 1965. Eduardo Mondlane’s 
Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO, 
fighters received free weapons from China and 
adopted Chinese tactics of guerrilla warfare. 
Shinn (2008) records that from the early 1960s 
FRELIMO began sending delegations to China. 
Within the framework of the Organization for 
African Unity, OAU, China equally coordinated 
its military training for liberation groups fighting 
for freedom from the colonial subjugation. It 
provided the organization’s liberation committee 
with 75% of all the military aid it received 
externally between 1971 and 1972 (Shinn 2008, 
Taylor, 2006). China trained and supplied arms to 
a number of losing opposition and revolutionary 
groups in Africa. It gave an early initial support 
to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola, MPLA. But as Angola had strengthened 
its ties with the Soviet Union, China shifted 
its military assistance in the late 1960s to the 
National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola, UNITA. Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s leader 
reportedly received military training in China 
(Rotberg, 2008). A few years later, China in a 
dramatic shift, had its support focused on the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, 
FNLA, and its leader, Holden Roberto. By the 
early 70s, China had deployed its 112 military 
instructors to Zaire, to train the FNLA. It was 
notable that China ignored its principles on 
noninterference, and got involved in Africa 
militarily.
China’s recent military presence  
in Africa 
China’s recent military involvement in 
Africa essentially takes the forms of selling 
Chinese arms, constructing a small arms factories 
in a number of African states, participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations, and the defense of 
Chinese oil investments and Chinese personnel 
who often come under heavy attacks in Africa’s 
conflict zones. China is a major supplier of small 
arms and light weapons to Africa. As noted by 
Alden (2007), military cooperation and growth 
of arms sales are parts and aspects of relations 
with African governments, especially those 
under threat because of the civil war, insurgency 
or even the domestic opposition, although 
which are barred from obtaining weapons from 
traditional western sources. Chinese AK-47 
assault rifles are common in national armies as 
well as among armed rebel groups such as those 
in eastern Congo. They have also appeared in 
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and in Chad and 
Darfur in Sudan. China’s arms sales to Africa 
stood at ＄1.3billion in 2003 (Alden 2007). From 
200 to 2003 China delivered about 13% of all the 
arms to sub-Saharan Africa, the second highest 
provider after Russia. From 2004 to 2007, China’s 
percentage increased to almost 18%, featuring 
the delivery of artillery pieces, armored cars, 
minor surface combatants, supersonic combat 
aircraft and other aircrafts (Grimmett 2008). 
While Chinese supplies may not be the highest, 
Chinese weaponry has nevertheless proved to be 
significant in some Africa’s bloodiest conflicts, 
where decades of civil wars have provided a 
welcome market for foreign arms merchants. 
The classic contemporary example of China’s 
weapon-exporting policy in Africa is China’s 
involvement in a Sudanese long war. In Sudan, 
Beijing pursued a policy that was entirely 
based on economic interest, and have supplied 
the Sudanese government with fighter aircraft 
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and an assortment of weaponry (Taylor, 2006, 
Shinn, 2009, Alden, 2007, and Brown & Sriam, 
2008). The Chinese have set up three small arms 
factories in Sudan that produce light weapons for 
use in the region as well as in Uganda.
Beginning from 2000, Mugabe’s Zimbabwe 
was faced with a series of punitive measures by 
the Western countries. Faced with the increased 
international isolation and the economic crisis 
reaching epic proportions, president Mugabe 
in 2005 announced a new “Look East” policy, 
turning its back to the West, and facing the 
East “from where the sun rises” (Brautigam, 
2009). Despite the country’s dangerous turmoil, 
and instability, China supplied Zimbabwe 
with about＄28million in arms between 2005 
and 2007 (SIPRI, 2010). Aside the sail of light 
weapons, China built a weapon factory for 
Zimbabwe (Meidan, 2006). In 2005 China 
sold to Zimbabwe, 6 jets for its air force. This 
was soon followed by 12 jet fighters and 100 
military vehicles, valued at about ＄240 million 
(Brown and Sriram, 2008). China supplied tanks, 
artillery, armored vehicles, antiaircraft batteries, 
riot control gear and radio-jamming equipments 
(Eisenman 2008). Just after Zimbabwe’s disputed 
March 2008 election, a Chinese freighter, An 
Yue Jiang, was returned to China after unions 
in South Africa and neighboring countries 
refused to offload the cargo. Four of the thirty-
six containers contained ammunition and rocket-
propelled grenades intended for trans-shipment 
to Zimbabwe (Brautigam, 2009). It was later 
reported that in that same year, that tones of that 
same ammunition were flown into Zimbabwe from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Nigerian 
government’s frustration with US congressional 
interference in the delivery of patrol boats for the 
troubled Niger Delta contributed to its decision 
to switch to Chinese military equipment. China 
granted Nigeria ＄1million in 2001 to upgrade 
its military facilities. A ＄251 million contract 
was negotiated between Nigeria and China to 
purchase twelve F-7M Airguard multipurpose 
combat aircraft and three FT-7NI dual-seat fighter 
trainer aircraft (Chau, 2007). The deal included 
twenty three PL-9 short-range air-to-air missiles, 
unguided rockets, and bombs for antitank and 
run runway denial missions, and training twelve 
Nigerian pilots in China. Ghana received the 
sum of ＄1.7 million from China in 2007 for the 
upgrading of its defense and military equipment. 
Prior to this, the two countries inaugurated a 
combined military-police barracks at the Burma 
Camp in Accra, financed by a ＄3.8million 
interest free loan. China sells aircraft to Egypt 
and Kenya (Hellstrom, 2009). Light strike aircraft 
such as the K-8 and the JF-17 multi-role combat 
aircraft have been sold to Algeria, Botswana, and 
Morocco (Grimmett, 2008). 
To sell or to buy arms is not, however, by 
itself condemnable, given especially the nature 
and order of international politics and practice 
(Morgenthau, 1948, Waltz, 2001). By supplying 
African governments with military equipment, 
China will be helping to strengthen the military 
capacities of its key allies in Africa, and expand 
its influence in oil-producing countries. The 
prospects for the significant revenue earnings 
from arms sales to Africa are relatively small 
(Hellstrom, 2009). Such sales are viewed as 
one sure means of enhancing China’s status as 
an international political power, and increasing 
its ability to obtain access to significant natural 
resources, especially oil (Smith, 2008, Wendell, 
2009, Dijk, 2009). However, what makes Chinese 
arms deals with Africa to come under serious 
criticism is its practice of flouting and breaching 
the United Nations arms embargo, and supplying 
to belligerent groups, thereby worsening already 
bad peace conditions of those areas into where 
such weapons are exported.
The past decade saw widespread changes 
in China’s foreign defense policy. The 2006 
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White Paper, China’s National Defense in 
2006, charges the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) with “implementing the military strategy 
of active defense” – a term that has grown to 
provide justification for the use of military force 
outside the PRC’s borders. For the first time, 
the paper outlines the PLA’s responsibilities: to 
take the initiative to prevent and defuse crises 
and deter conflicts and wars, to take part in 
international security cooperation, to strengthen 
strategic coordination and consultation with 
major powers and neighboring countries, and to 
conduct bilateral or multilateral joint military 
exercises and play an active part in maintaining 
global and regional peace and stability (Parenti, 
2009). Bolstered by the change in policy, China 
began to send its troops to UN peacekeeping 
operations in Africa. Chinese peacekeepers are 
deployed to the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations worldwide, but their presence 
in Africa is striking. Approximately 2,000 
peacekeepers which China has deployed around 
the world, on overage during the first nine 
months in 2008, 77 percent were in Africa. 
China is by far the largest contributor to Africa 
peacekeeping among the Security Council’s 
permanent members, with 63 percent of total 
p-5 contributions to the continent (Qiang and 
Tian, 2009). China’s participation in the United 
Nations peacekeeping regime and composition 
of its deployments allow Beijing to develop and 
nurture its national interests, maintain friendly 
and noninterventionist relations with recipient 
governments, and at the same time project 
the image of a responsible stakeholder on the 
international stage. Sudan is a case to point. 
China has consistently opposed efforts within 
the Security Council to pressure or punish 
Khartoum, and in fact China has been among 
the large suppliers of weapons to the Sudanese 
government. Yet at the same time, it has deployed 
personnel to both the United Nations Mission in 
Southern Sudan, and the hybrid African Union-
UN Mission in Darfur (SaveDarfur, 2007). 
Consistent with Beijing’s reluctance to 
interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state, the 
composition of Chinese deployments is generally 
on the softer side of such military interventions. 
The total number of Chinese personnel which 
is contributed to missions around the globe, 
5 percent are military observers, 14 percent 
are police, and 81 percent are troops (Parenti, 
2009). In Africa, the troop’s component of 
China’s contribution is even higher, at 91 
percent. Troops carry out a variety of tasks and 
functions. In addition, to combat units tasked 
with defending UN installations and personnel 
as well as local civilians in immediate danger, 
this component includes enabling units such as 
engineers, logistics staff, and medical personnel. 
Unlike the contingents of police and military 
observers which are composed in a mixture of 
personnel from all contributing countries, troops 
are deployed in their native home units, which 
leave the contributing countries with substantial 
influence on their deployment whereabouts and, 
though rarely, the ability to utilize those troops 
for projects other than those mandated by the 
mission (Levy, 2009).
In Africa, the vast majority of China’s 
peacekeeping troops fall within the category of 
enabling units. China’s contribution to the United 
Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), consisted 
of a 315 member engineering contingent dispatched 
to help with the construction of camps, roads and 
bridges. Well diggers and the relevant equipment 
was also sent by China to Darfur region to solve 
the problem of water shortage facing the hybrid 
African Union-United Nations force. Similarly 
to the Southern Sudan, China contributed to 
UN Mission in Sudan 460 engineers, transport 
experts, and medical personnel. All in all, 
according to the vice director of the Peacekeeping 
Affairs office of China’s Ministry of National 
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Defense, Wei Yanwei, Chinese peacekeepers 
worldwide have built or repaired more than 200 
bridges and 7, 500 kilometers of roads, airports, 
and water supply infrastructures, and they have 
treated nearly 50,000 local patients (Buisness 
Day 2004). The pattern is similar in Liberia 
where China’s 530 peacekeeping troops consist 
of engineering, transportation, and medical staff. 
Of the approximately 200 Chinese peacekeepers 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there were 
175 were engineers and 40 medical personnel, 
who provided an applauded medical support in 
Central Africa
While these various enabling units are 
tasked mainly with supporting the mission and 
its peacekeepers’ needs, records show that in the 
process, many facilities, items of infrastructure, 
and services that benefit local populations are also 
being constructed and rehabilitated (Levy, 2009, 
Harland, 2004). In this aspect of peacekeeping, 
the soft security portion of nation’s building 
and reconstruction, the greatest opportunity lies 
for using soft power to promote China’s wider 
national interests. Significantly, China’s largest 
peacekeeping contributions in Africa are also 
where it has made large investments in natural 
resources, and where good government-to-
government relations will ultimately benefit its 
economic interest.
Peace implication  
of chinese military roles in africa
Peace is a prominent, core feature in China’s 
official presentation of its purpose of international 
affairs in Africa. The importance of peace and 
resolving conflicts is regularly invoked by Beijing, 
but this is not significant in China’s engagement. 
China’ Africa policy (2006), for example, devotes 
just one paragraph to this area (Large, 2008). 
Likewise the humanitarian and peace assistance 
China has provided, mostly in kind, is minor in 
comparison to its investments in Africa. Chinese 
government has not proactively sought to 
involve itself in Africa’s peace processes, rather 
it has affirmed the primary responsibility of the 
international community and engaged as and 
when its interests have been threatened. Chinese 
companies in places are reinforcing pre-existing 
resource-related conflict dynamics in Africa. For 
example, China’s recent entry into the Nigerian 
oil sector has involved Chinese companies 
becoming caught up in a conflict between the 
Nigerian state and militias, with China supplying 
fighter jets, missiles and training (Alden, 2007). 
As such, the already wobbling peace condition of 
the continent has been negatively impacted upon 
by China’s foray into Africa.
To meet its oil and mineral needs, Beijing 
has consistently delivered arms to pariah states in 
Africa, especially the conflict-torn zones which 
have come under western sanctions and the United 
Nations’ embargo, in their attempt to address the 
horrendous massacre and genocidal killings that 
have characterized the politics of those areas. 
Additionally, China has been implicated in the 
proliferation of arms in Africa which either 
provoke conflicts or exacerbate the existing 
ones (Tongkeh, 2009, Alden, 2005, Taylor, 2005, 
SaveDarfur, 2007). Many Chinese firms were 
accused of smuggling illegal arms: Chinese AK-
47, machine guns and rocket propelled grenade 
launchers into Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Ivory 
Coast, where rebels and mercenaries were 
involved in civil wars. These arms gain faster 
inroads owing to their relatively cheap costs. Thus, 
China can be held responsible (alongside with 
others) for the death and destruction that Africa’s 
various wars have brought upon the people of the 
continent. Such military involvement in ongoing 
civil wars and conflict situations in Africa is 
not resolving in the peace of Africa. There is a 
very real danger that Beijing’s supposed ‘non-
interference’ stance merely masks the bottom 
line: the chase for profits and oil (Taylor, 2006). 
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This has been carried on with nonchalance 
towards Africa’s political stability and peace. As 
Ian Taylor noted, “unmoved by … concerns and 
without fear of political consequences, Chinese 
government seems willing to fuel a small-arms 
race in sub-Saharan Africa to generate additional 
revenues for the PLA”. It is a common knowledge 
that China employed military means to protect 
its economic interests in Sudan and elsewhere 
in Africa, thereby contributing to a steady 
degeneration of the already tenuous security 
and humanitarian situations in the continent. 
At the instance of attack on its oil installations 
in Kordofan, a Sudanese region neighbouring 
Darfur, Chinese government reportedly deployed 
about 400 soldiers in civilian clothing, to protect 
its economic investment against the assault of the 
rebels (Gerttz and Rowan, 2004, Dijk, 2009, Shinn, 
2008). This was the first time China directly got 
involved militarily in Africa’s troubling domestic 
politics. While under attack in Ethiopia by the 
Ogaden Liberation Front, China was not to stand 
and watch its oil explorers die. Beijing’s decision 
was to start defending and protecting its workers 
with armed guards (Puska, 2008). In the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria, Chinese employees of Chinese 
oil companies have also been attacked. China 
concludes that such events make it difficult for 
China to maintain its non-interference stance 
(Dijk, 2009). Hence, China considered military 
presence in certain Africa countries, thereby 
becoming a part of Africa’s exacerbating conflict 
situation rather than being a solution.
In Zimbabwe, oppressive rule has been 
sustained owing to some extent, China’s 
substantial military support to president Robert 
Mugabe. It is on the record that Mugabe damaged 
democracy in Zimbabwe, sanctioned brutal gang 
violence against opposition parties, condoned the 
kidnapping and torture of human rights activists, 
and encouraged a chaotic land redistribution that 
delivered many farms into the hands of politicians 
who coveted them, rather than the landless 
poor. This tenuous power-sharing arrangement 
provoked the violence in the country. Attempts 
by human rights activists and the international 
community to readress and halt this abuse 
was frustrated by Chinese continued military 
support to the dictator. With assured weaponry 
and military supply from China, the brutality 
inflicted by the supporters of Robert Mugabe 
and the ZANU-PF was to continue (Brautigam, 
2009, Dijk, 2009). Despite the country’s 
dangerous turmoil and instability, China supplied 
Zimbabwe with millions of dollars worth of arms. 
This supply was intended for Mugabe’s more 
lethal crackdown on his political opposition. It is 
widely believed that China’s military support and 
supplies prolonged Zimbabwe’s crisis.
Darfur reveals the hollowness of the post-
Holocaust promise of “never again”. In Darfur 
for nearly three years, the Sudanese government 
together with militia proxies committed 
widespread, systematic violence against the 
region’s black African population. The violence 
was massive and often executed in a broad 
daylight. Arab perpetrators displaced more than 
two million black Africans and claimed the lives 
of more than two hundred thousand civilians 
(Scott, 2006). But what has been the role of China 
in this drama? China has played a direct role in 
selling arms to Sudan and developing its weapons 
industry. Chinese arms sales rose twenty five fold 
within the Sudan’s war years (SaveDarfur, 2007). 
Much of this occurred in spite of the United 
Nations Security Council’s arm embargo. In spite 
of China’s denials, evidence points out to the 
contrary. Shell casings collected from various sites 
in Darfur suggest that most of the ammunition 
used by parties of the conflict in Darfur has 
been manufactured in China (United Nations, 
2006). China has a huge investment in Sudanese 
economy, the oil sector in particular (Brautigam, 
2009, Dijk, 2009, Rotberg, 2008). China is the 
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leading developer of Sudanese oil industry and a 
major purchaser of Sudanese oil. Though Beijing 
regularly justifies China’s economic involvement 
in Sudan as being the key to that country’s 
development, but it is obvious that in the context 
of rising imperative for peace and multilateral 
efforts to halt the blood-thirsty Khartoum regime, 
the concentration of wealth and weapons among 
the Sudan’s ruling elite by Chinese investment 
and arms deals, unconditionally feeds conflict. As 
the Sudanese erstwhile Deputy Central Bank the 
governor, Elijah Aleng said, “When you exploit 
oil resources and nothing goes to the population, 
then you are financing the war against them with 
resources and that is negative” (Sunday Tribune, 
2007). With the help of its Muslim Janjaweed 
militia groups and the blessing of Bashir, the 
Sudanese Air Force has used Chinese-given 
weapons against defenseless villagers in Darfur 
(Scott, 2006, Puska, 2007). There have been also 
persistent claims by independent aid groups that 
Sudanese government troops and rebels have 
used Chinese oil company airstrips to conduct 
bombing raids on villages and hospitals. The 
pilots of the Fatan A5 jets used in massacres 
against unarmed civilians in Darfur, were trained 
by China (Bonincontro, 2010). 
It was for sure, during China’s presidency 
of the United Nations Security Council that 
Resolution 1769 was passed, contributing as it 
appeared, to the peace of that highly disturbed part 
of Africa. But reports indicate that owing to its 
accruing economic gains from the sales of arms, 
China worked behind the scenes to significantly 
weaken the terms of the resolution (SaveDarfur, 
2007, Stakelbeck, 2006). Working with Sudan, 
China succeeded in deleting language that 
would have set the stage for mandatory Security 
Council’s targeted sanctions, where Sudan failed 
to cooperate in implementing the Resolution. The 
hybrid force’s mandate to “seize and dispose” 
weapons found in Darfur in contravention of the 
arms embargo was diluted in the final text. The 
force was permitted merely to “monitor them” 
(Small Arms Survey, 2007). China’s prolonged 
reluctance to endorse the United Nations entrance 
into Sudan, to halt the carnage and horrendous 
killings of thousands, especially children and 
women, was based on its deeply entrenched 
economic gains arising from exportation of 
military arms and oil exploration, but neatly 
cloaked under the noninterference principles. 
The Chinese officials and media claimed that: 
“the root causes of the Darfur conflict were 
poverty and lack of development” (Stakelbeck, 
2006: 4). Even if we admit the twin factors of 
poverty and lack of development as causal factors 
in the Darfur conflict, we ask: will a continued 
military support and supply of weapons to the 
already boiling Sudan vitiate or exacerbate the 
internecine situation? Denying any logic in the 
China’s noninterference ploy, Stakebeck (2006: 
4) concluded that “China’s Sudan policy is 
manipulative and opportunistic…” Ignoring the 
displacement of an estimated 2 million Sudanese 
villagers and the murder of 180 000 others for 
its economic gain, China worked to have it both 
ways. While it sold lethal military weapons to 
the government of Bashir, and protected it from 
UN sanctions, it gave humanitarian aid to the 
estranged Darfur. At best, the resultant effect is 
that the peace that is a desideratum became rather 
distanced as the north and the south civil war in 
Darfur became perpetuated. In like manner, while 
Ethiopia and Eritrea were towards war, Chinese 
corporations transferred a substantial share of 1 
billion US dollars in weapons to both countries 
between 1998 and 2000 (Taylor, 2005). Rather 
than dousing the conflict in Rwanda, China’s 
arm deals with the belligerent groups worsened 
already bad peace and security condition of that 
country. In 1995, a Chinese ship carrying 152 
tones of ammunition and light weapons was 
refused permission to unload in Tanzania. The 
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cargo was destined for the Tutsi-dominated army 
of Burundi, and Tanzania was concerned that 
ethnic conflict there would be exacerbated by 
the arms shipment (Williams and Taylor, 2005). 
China’s delivery of these weapons goes with the 
fact of the final destinations being mislabeled and 
the weapons disguised as agricultural equipment 
(ODI, 1998). By these, China can be held 
responsible for impacting negatively on Africa’s 
wobbling peace.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Chinese arms exporters furnished Laurent Kabila 
with arms in 1997, and had been supplying the 
vexed and troubled Kinshasa with weapons. 
Sierra-Leone’s brutal civil war was fuelled by 
extensive shipments of Chinese arms. Taylor 
(2005) notes that China has been Sierra-Leone’s 
main arms supplier and increased shipments 
when the civil war began. Chinese arms deals 
in Sierra-Leone repeatedly broke the United 
Nations sanctions and substantially helped to 
damage the country’s aspiration for peace and 
development. One has to question the coherence 
and credibility of Chinese peacekeeping efforts in 
Africa when China otherwise pursues strategies 
which contribute to the eruption and prolongation 
of violent conflicts in the continent. For example, 
while China is currently an important troop-
contributing country to the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia, its economic interests helped 
Charles Taylor to maintain himself in power. 
China imported almost half of Liberia’s timber in 
2000, and thus provided Taylor with considerable 
wherewithal (Tull, 2006). It was only in 2003 that 
China, an important buyer of Liberian timber 
brought itself to reluctantly nod through the 
United Nations sanctions against Liberia which it 
had previously opposed on the devious grounds of 
“increased unemployment” in Liberia (Johnston, 
2004: 447)
The popular notion that China’s peacekeeping 
involvement in Africa represents its interest 
in Africa’s peace is at best abstract. Large 
(2008:37) argues rightly that “China’s attitude to 
conflict resolution in Africa reflects contrasting 
policy priorities and economic interests”. The 
importance of peace and resolving conflict is 
regularly invoked by Beijing, however this is not 
a significant aspect of Chinese engagement in 
Africa. The instances where China has actively 
and substantially responded to conflict resolution 
and mediation efforts in Africa are few. It has 
not proactively sought to involve itself in peace 
process, rather it has affirmed the primary 
responsibility of the international community, and 
engaged as and when its personal interests have 
been threatened. And when it gets involved, the 
Chinese government operates only a secondary 
support role. While the Chinese contributions 
to peacekeeping and anti-piracy may be said to 
be positive for Africa, its arms sales have had 
negative implications for Africa’s peace. 
Chinese arms sales to Africa fuel an arm 
race. It is reported that Chinese specialists 
in heavy military equipment have been sent 
to Equatorial Guinea to provide training for 
equipments that the country do not even have 
(Taylor, 2005). This was presumably in order to 
sell such weapons to Equatorial Guinea for oil 
reasons. For about three months, Chinese trainers 
worked with the local army, yet Equatorial 
Guinea has no such heavy weapons. The import 
of this was that given the climbing oil prices and 
its accruing financial profits Beijing stepped 
in to offer Equatorial Guinea military weapons 
and training for the protection of its oil wells 
from Nigeria, and Cameroon. The possible 
resultant effect of such moves is the fuelling of 
“some sort of arms race in the Gulf of Guinea” 
(Williams and Taylor, 2005:96). In 2004, China 
sold military weapons to Zimbabwe worth ＄40 
million (Brooks & Shin, 2006). This included 
12 Chinese-made FC-1 fighter aircrafts and 100 
military vehicles. The FC-1 is a multipurpose 
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fighter, targeted to serve as a challenge to the 
JAS-39 Gripen multipurpose fighters purchased 
by South Africa from Sweden (Shinn, 2008). This 
transaction caused considerable apprehension in 
South Africa, and led to international concerns 
about a regional arms race.
The eastern DRC constitutes one of the 
longest-running conflicts in Africa, with attendant 
murderous killings. Accounts are numerous that 
Chinese small arms have contributed to the 
killing. Amnesty International reported that 
Chinese AK-47s were common among soldiers, 
militia and armed groups operating in the Kivu 
Provinces and the Ituri District of the DRC where 
the weapons have been used to commit atrocities 
(Holslag, 2007). China’s act of continued arms 
sales to Africa’s problem areas, cynical military 
relations and support to rogue and blood-thirst 
regimes, and its double-dealing peacekeeping 
roles in Africa, do not help the peace conditions 
of Africa’s wobbling states. It rather furnishes and 
escalates conflicts. As these conflicts surge, the 
lacked but much needed development in Africa 
is further distanced. Incontestably, conflicts have 
the capacity to severely constrain development 
endeavours by destroying infrastructure, 
interrupting the production process and diverting 
resources away from productive uses (Chuka, 
2008). Sudanese erstwhile finance minister had 
to admit that up to 70% of Sudan’s oil generated 
wealth in the inter war years was devoted to weapon 
acquisition and war execution (Gentleman, 2006). 
The obvious resultant effect is that even in the post 
conflict period, the state becomes emasculated of 
its provisioning power to its citizens. There is a 
consensus among conflict theorists (Ali 2006, 
Azar 1994) that there is an indubitable causal 
linkage between undevelopment and conflict. 
The feeling of frustration arising from the state’s 
failure to provide basic needs for its people 
produces aggressive citizens who will resort to 
aggression and conflict. Through this process, 
violence has assumed a circling phenomenon in 
Africa.
Conclusion
From the early years of contact with Africa, 
China has manifested military involvements in 
Africa. This has been in the areas of military 
training and assistance, arms sales, anti-piracy 
and peacekeeping operations. As much as the 
peacekeeping efforts may have engaged China 
in a positive way in Africa’s conflict zones, but 
continued arm sales in a manner that exacerbate 
African conflicts, China certainly cannot be 
helping the much needed peace in Africa. China 
was opposed to sanctions against Sudan and 
Zimbabwe and instead continued its controversial 
military arms sales to them for its economic gain, 
ignoring the tenuous security situations in those 
countries. Sale of arms may not by itself be cynical, 
given the nature and order of international politics 
and practice. However, what makes Chinese 
arms deals with Africa to come under serious 
criticism is its practice of flouting and breaching 
the United Nations arms embargo, and supplying 
to belligerent groups, thereby worsening the 
already bad peace conditions of those areas 
where such weapons are exported. Through 
so many communiqué, China has consistently 
put Washington on the notice that it would not 
tolerate any US insensitivity to China’s interests 
by demanding an end to US arm sales to Taiwan. 
Knowing the danger and threat it continued sale 
of arms portends to its peace and aspiration for a 
harmonious China, one will wonder why China 
will not extend such understanding in its relations 
with Africa.
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Военное присутствие Китая в Африке: 
Последствия для неустойчивого мира в Африке
Чука Энука
Университет имени Ннамди Азикиве 
Аука, штат Анамбра, П. М. Б. 5052, Аука - Нигерия
Эта статья рассматривает военный аспект векового взаимодействия между Китаем и 
Африкой и как он влияет на мир в Африке. Вопросы, затрагивающие отношения между 
Китаем и Африкой, несомненно получили распространение в академических дискуссиях, 
сконцентрированных в основном на торговых и экономических факторах. Тем не менее, 
военные аспекты отношений, особенно военное вмешательство Китая в Африке, проходят 
с минимальным вниманием ученых, но все же нуждаются в изучении. Учитывая степень 
расширения участия Китая в Африке, в этой статье обсуждается военный фактор. Статья 
исторически контекстуализирует китайско-африканские военные связи и свидетельствует, 
что продолжающаяся продажа оружия из Китая в проблемные зоны Африки, циничные 
военные отношения и поддержка неконтролируемого и кровопролитного режима, и его 
двурушничество миротворческой роли в Африке не помогают установлению мирных условий в 
неустойчивых государствах Африки.
Ключевые слова: китайско-африканские отношения, продажа оружия, военное присутствие, 
мир в Африке, конфликт.
